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REAL-TIME PREDICTION OF RELIABILITY OF DYNAMIC 
POSITIONING SUB-SYSTEMS FOR COMPUTATION OF DYNAMIC 
POSITIONING RELIABILITY INDEX (DP-RI) USING LONG SHORT 
TERM MEMORY (LSTM)  
ABSTRACT 
In this study, a framework using Long Short Term Memory 
(LSTM) for prediction of reliability of Dynamic Positioning (DP) 
sub-systems for computation of Dynamic Positioning Reliability 
Index (DP-RI) has been proposed. The DP System is complex 
with significant levels of integration between many sub-systems 
such as the Reference System, DP Control System, Thruster / 
Propulsion System, Power System, Electrical System and the 
Environment System to perform diverse control functions. The 
proposed framework includes a mathematical computation 
approach to compute reliability of DP sub-systems and a data 
driven approach to predict the reliability at a sub-system level 
for evaluation of model performance and accuracy. The 
framework results demonstrate excellent performance under a 
wide range of data availability and guaranteed lower 
computational burden for real-time non-linear optimization.  
There are three main components of the proposed architecture 
for the mathematical formulation of the DP sub-systems based 
on individual sensor arrangements within the sub-system, 
computation of reliability of sub-systems and optimized LSTM 
deep learning algorithm for prediction of its reliability. Firstly, 
the mathematical formulation for the reliability of sub-systems is 
determined based on the series/parallel arrangement of the 
sensors of each individual equipment item within the sub-
systems. Secondly, the computation of the reliability of sub-
systems is achieved through an integrated approach during 
complex operation of the vessel. Thirdly, the novel optimized 
LSTM network is constructed to predict the reliability of the sub-
systems while minimizing integral errors in the algorithm. 
In this paper, numerical simulations are set-up using a state-of-
the-art advisory decision-making tool with mock-up and real-
world data to give insights into the model performance and 
validate it against the existing risk assessment methodologies. 
1 Contact author: charles.fernandez@dnvgl.com 
2 Contact author: a.k.dev@newcastle.ac.uk 
Furthermore, we have analyzed the efficiency and stability of the 
proposed model against various levels of data availability. In 
conclusion the prediction accuracy of the proposed model is 
scalable and higher when compared with other model results. 
Keywords: Dynamic positioning systems, Station Keeping, 
Deep Learning,  Long Short Term Memory, DP sub-system 
reliability,  Forecasting, Decision making, Reliability Index.  
1. INTRODUCTION
Dynamic Positioning (DP) systems have enabled the maritime,
Oil and Gas industry to operate in deeper and deeper waters in
search for resources to meet ever increasing energy demands.
Loss of position or Loss of heading are considered to be serious
incident / accident events in the context of the DP system. Loss
of position / heading indicates that the vessel is not able to stay
in the pre-defined stationary position or path. The loss of position
may be due to drive off or drift off. The DP system consists of
several sub-systems all of which contribute to the overall
reliability. The Dynamic Positioning Reliability Index (DP-RI)
indicates the quantitative reliability during complex marine
operations [1]. The key elements for evaluating the performance
of the system are its holding capability and reliability. The
holding capability is measured through DP capability
assessment. However, the reliability cannot be directly measured
and calculated. The reason for this is that rules and guidelines
doesn’t specify the requirements for the level of reliability, they
just provide minimum requirements for the reliability and safety
of the vessels, equipment, persons and the environment [2]. One
of the ways to ensure reliability is to provide redundancy in the
design. Redundancy itself does not guarantee a sufficient level
of reliability. The vessel’s mission profile should determine what
overall level of reliability should be attained to achieve the
required vessel availability. Higher vessel availability can be
achieved by the application of non-critical redundancy.
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The most effective way to ensure good reliability is through 
design, for example by specifying high reliability components, 
carriage of critical spare parts and reducing the number of fault 
paths that lead to a loss of redundancy. Similarly, during in 
service operation, planned maintenance, condition monitoring 
and annual trials will contribute to ensuring sufficient reliability. 
Reliability is a product of the quality of equipment and suppliers 
selected, the competence of the engineers who design and build 
the DP vessel and competence of the crew and management who 
maintain and operate it [3]. The DP system of a vessel involves 
complex interactions between a large number of sub-systems. 
Each sub-system plays a unique role in the continuous overall 
DP function for safe and reliable operation of the vessel [4]. The 
DP system is divided into the following sub-systems in the DP-
RI concept [1, 4]: 
• Reference System (System A1)
• DP control system (System A2)
• Thrusters / Propulsion System (System A3)
• Power System (System A4)
• Electrical System (System A5)
• Environment System (System A6)
• Human / Operator Error System (System A7)
In Section 2 of this paper the authors present the current method 
of assessing the sub-system reliability and the application of 
LSTM followed by Section 3 in which the reliability modelling 
methodology is defined with sub-system architecture, modes of 
operation and criticality  categorization among sub-system 
signals. Section 4 presents the experimental set-up for the 
reliability determination through mathematical calculation and 
reliability prediction through the LSTM model. In Section 5, the 
results and analysis of the effectiveness of the LSTM for the 
reliability prediction of sub-systems are discussed and validated. 
Finally, Section 7 is the conclusion on the effectiveness of 
proposed framework with LSTM for prediction of reliability of 
sub-systems and using it in a bottom-up approach for  overall 
DP-RI prediction. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Recent developments in technology have contributed towards
the optimal performance of DP systems with increased accuracy
of positioning and faster response to the effects caused by the
environmental conditions. This in-turn has resulted in the
addition of sensors and equipment for redundancy leading to
complex DP system design [5].  Redundancy does not in itself
guarantee a sufficient level of reliability to necessarily lead to
overall availability although it can contribute to availability if the
redundant elements themselves are sufficiently reliable [2].
There are various factors that needs to be considered in the
selection of DP control systems which include reliability and
potential service life of components, subsystems and systems,
sensor handling, sources of power, remote diagnostic capability,
mathematical modelling, consequence analysis aligned with
WCFDI and potential  service life and obsolescence. This clearly
indicates the reliability of sub-system is one of key aspect for DP
control system and it plays vital role during complex operation.
Reliability of sub-systems is usually defined as the probability 
that a sub-system can perform a required function under given 
conditions for a given time interval [6]. Today industrial practice 
is that the sub-system reliability is a product of the quality of the 
equipment and suppliers selected, the competence of the 
engineers who design and build the DP vessel and the 
competence of the crew and management who maintain and 
operate it. DP vessels should ensure a required level of station 
keeping reliability before preparing for any operation.  
DP rules and guidelines sometimes do not specify a level of 
reliability. When mentioned, it is in the context of the 
consequences of loss of position, then the DP  vessel’s 
availability to work can be related to the probability of losing 
fault tolerance [7]. DP related equipment should be selected on 
the basis of high reliability and resistance to internal and external 
influences which may reduce that reliability [2]. Modern DP 
vessels are complex machines with several layers of automation, 
integration between sub-systems, degrees of diversity and more 
fault tolerance enabling the following features [3]: 
• Autonomy • Diversity
• Decentralization • Differentiation
• Orthogonality
Most of the shipyard’s contractual position is to meet the class 
requirement, however the vessel owners should express the need 
for higher reliability for the sub-systems. The mission profile and 
desire to achieve greater availability may end up influencing the 
vessel operators and owner to exceed minimum requirement. 
This will lead to improvement in reliability, operability and 
maintainability. The sub-system reliability is achieved from 
component reliability which is choice of individual elements of 
equipment or software for prolonging mean time between failure 
(MTBF) [8]. 
Typically for Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA) of DP 
systems, Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) will be developed 
considering the impact of the worst case failure. Following on 
from this, Bayesian networks are used for advanced offshore 
vessels for evaluating the reliability during the design stage, 
before the proving trial [6]. However, any of these methods does 
not guarantee the status of sub-systems and their reliability in all 
failure scenarios [9]. The risk analysis and the assessment just 
focus on the evaluation during the design stage and improve the 
design rather than supporting the operator during complex 
marine operations. Recently LSTM has been used for prediction 
within the maritime industry [10].Thus a new framework was 
developed to test its suitability for DP-RI. 
3. METHODOLOGY
DP can be considered as a safety related system as it incorporates
one or more electrical and/or electronic and/or programmable
electronic devices for its control functions to keep the Equipment
Under Control (EUC) during any undesirable event. Therefore,
functional safety concepts could be easily applied to the DP
system for the detection of a potentially dangerous condition
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resulting in the activation of a protective or corrective device or 
mechanism to prevent hazardous events arising or providing 
mitigation to reduce the consequence of the hazardous event. The 
application of IEC 61508 to DP systems is concerned with 
achieving functional safety, where unacceptable risk (loss of 
position) results in physical injury or damage to the health of 
people, either directly or indirectly [11]. 
The reliability of the sub-systems at a high level is calculated by 
using the principles of IEC 61508 which enabled to 
mathematically compute the approximate reliability to be used 
for most of QRA to improve the design by providing more 
redundancy [12]. With these calculations, the reliability reduces 
due to complexity and the greater the number of independent 
systems, the more likely it is that one or more will be unavailable 
in a given time period. These dis-advantages cannot be easily 
addressed with the current traditional method of reliability 
assessment. Therefore, it is necessary to develop a mathematical 
model which will enable accurate calculation of the reliability of 
sub-systems at any point in time and provide a solution for each 
of the items below [6]: 
• Limiting the impact of the worst case failure to enhance
post failure capability
• Optimizing equipment utilization
• Providing fault tolerance in the form of redundancy
3.1 Reliability Block Diagram 
A reliability block diagram (RBD) presents a logical relationship 
of the system, sub-systems and components. A system can be 
modelled for reliability computation and analysis using block 
diagrams [12]. A DP system consists of sub-systems and 
components connected to perform given functions and maintain 
vessel position and heading. Due to the integration between sub-
systems, it can become complex, making reliability analysis 
difficult. A mathematical model reduces the system to a 
graphical representation of the interconnection of its sub-
systems. A typical reliability model can be represented as shown 
in Figure 1. These RBD can be used for  mathematical 
calculation and prediction of the reliability of sub-systems. 
Figure 1. Typical Reliability Block Diagram of Complex System 
3.2 Sub-System Architecture 
The sub-systems can be represented through an RBD based on 
the system design architecture. The system architecture can be 
one of the below models [12]: 
• Static System Models • Stand-By System
• Series Model • (K,n) System
• Parallel Model
Based on the system configuration, the sub-system reliability is 
calculated using the principle of probability theory.  If the system 
has more than one function, each function must be considered 
individually, and a separate reliability block diagram has to be 
established for each system function. The system reliability can 
then be modeled using the reliability of the various sub-systems. 
The mathematical model can be used to assist in making changes 
to the system for reliability improvement. The model can be used 
to identify weak links in the system and to indicate where 
reliability improvement activities should be introduced. It can be 
used to determine test and maintenance procedures. Modeling of 
the system should be initiated as soon as preliminary designs are 
completed, and the model should be updated as design changes 
are made to the system.  
3.3 Modes of Operation 
A DP system operates in different modes during complex marine 
operations depending on the functionalities required by the 
vessel in one of the following modes [2, 3, 13]: 
• Station Keeping • Joystick
• Auto-Pilot mode • Auto Heading
• Follow Target Auto track
The Operator and Captain would ensure that the sub-systems are 
arranged as per the operating manuals, instructions and based on 
experience for particular complex marine operations. From a 
functional safety perspective, the components within the sub-
system will be operating in specific modes to fulfill the 
requirements of the safety related systems. The modes of 
operation for the components within the sub-systems will fall 
into one of the following modes for safety functions based on the 
vessel type and DP configuration [11, 14]: 
• Low demand mode
• High demand mode
• Continuous Mode
3.4 Sub-System voting configuration 
The sub-system architecture and modes of operation determine 
the component’s configuration and voting group to prevent 
failure of a safety function in the case of accidental events. The 
sub-system and  the components within the sub-system are 
grouped under one of the following voting configurations (in 
which “oo” stands for “out-of” to provide redundancy and 
reliability functionality [11, 12]: 
• 1oo1 • 2oo2
• 1oo2 • 2oo3
• 1oo3
3.5 Critical, Non-Critical, Redundant or Non-
Redundant grouping 
In evaluation of DP system design it is often revealed that the 
common connection between the sub-systems intended to 
provide redundancy creates the probability for a fault to occur 
[8]. A fault in one redundant system can affect another 
independent system. Redundancy doesn’t guarantee a high level 
of reliability therefore, it is evident that the fault tolerant concept 
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needs to follow the above class requirements. The following 
arrangement can be found on typical DP vessels in order to 
achieve higher reliability and availability [3, 13, 15]: 
• Critical Redundant • Non-Critical Redundant
• Critical Non-redundant • Non-Critical Non-redundant
3.6 Sub-System Equipment, Sensors and Criticality 
Definition 
The mathematical computation model and prediction model for 
the reliability of the sub-system can be computed only when the 
system design assumptions and uncertainties are properly 
defined [16]. In this section, the vessel type, class, system set-
up, sub-system configuration, critical, non-critical, redundant, 
non-redundant grouping and design boundary are defined for the 
experiment in the next section. The sub-system signals were 
identified and grouped across different categorizations, 
considering the design phase for evaluation. The grouping of the 
signals for the different sub-systems are presented in the 
following sections [17, 2, 3, 13, 15, 6] 
The sub-systems component arrangement, architecture, voting 
group and criticality grouping are shown in Table 1 to Table 7. 
Table 1: Reference System – Signal Configuration 
DESCRIPTION CRITICAL REDUNDANT 
GYRO – 3 Unit (1oo3) 
Heading  (deg) Yes Yes 
Rate of Rotation (deg/min) Yes Yes 
Yaw (%) Yes Yes 
Preferred No No 
Enable  No No 
Failure / Error No No 
VESSEL REFERNECE UNIT – 4 Unit (1oo3) 
Roll (mm) Yes Yes 
Pitch (mm) Yes Yes 
Yaw (mm) Yes Yes 
Preferred No No 
Enable  No No 
Failure / Error  No No 
GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM (GPS)  - 3 Unit (1oo3) 
Vessel Speed (m/s) Yes Yes 
Course Direction (deg) Yes Yes 
Preferred No No 
Enable  No No 
Failure / Error  No No 
DGPS – 2 Unit (1oo2) 
Relative Speed (m/s) Yes Yes 
Relative Direction (deg) Yes Yes 
Preferred No No 
Enable  No No 
Failure / Error  No No 
Table 2: DP Control System – Signal Configuration 
DESCRIPTION CRITICAL REDUNDANT 
GYRO – 3 Unit (1oo3) 
Operator Station (OS) Yes Yes 
Power Supply (PS) Failure Yes Yes 
DESCRIPTION CRITICAL REDUNDANT 
Communication Failure Yes Yes 
NETWORK DISTRIBUTION UNIT NDU – 6 Unit (1oo2) 
Network (Dual Network) Yes Yes 
FIELD STATION FS – 6 Units (1oo2) 
Field Station (FS) Yes Yes  
Input/Output Signal Failure  Yes Yes 
Input/Output Signal Failure No No 
Input/Output Module Failure Yes Yes 
Failure / Error  No No 
REDUNTANT CONTROLLER  UNIT RCU – 6 Units (1oo3) 
Controllers (Triple Redundant) Yes Yes 
Vessel Mode of Operation Yes Yes 
Vessel Class (DP 3, DP 2 & DP1) Yes Yes 
Rotation Center Position Yes Yes 
Thruster Force Vector Yes Yes 
Pitch Yes Yes 
Roll Yes Yes 
Vessel Model Yes Yes 
Environmental Error  Yes Yes 
High Precision Control Mode Yes Yes 
Current Position (deg) No Yes 
Set Position  (deg) No Yes 
Allocation Mode No Yes 
Moment (kNm) No Yes 
Resultant Force (kN) No Yes 
Resultant Direction (deg) No Yes 
Required Force (kN) No Yes 
Required Direction (deg) No Yes 
Table 3: Thruster / Propulsion System – Signal Configuration 
DESCRIPTION CRITICAL REDUNDANT 
THRUSTERS – 8 unit (1oo2) 
ANALOG CONTROL SIGNAL 
Azimuth Pitch Command (deg)  Yes Yes 
Azimuth Speed Command (rpm) Yes Yes 
Torque Command (N) Yes Yes 
Pitch Dev  Yes Yes 
Speed Dev  Yes Yes 
Torque Dev Yes Yes 
Power Available (kW) Yes Yes 
ANALOG MONITORING SIGNAL 
Power Used (kW)  Yes Yes 
Torque (N)  Yes Yes 
Current (A) Yes Yes 
Voltage (V)  Yes Yes 
Speed (rpm)  Yes Yes 
Pitch Angle (deg)  Yes No 
Steering Oil Pressure (bar)  Yes Yes 
Azimuth Speed (RPM)  Yes Yes 
Azimuth Angle (deg) Yes Yes 
Motor Speed (RPM)  Yes Yes 
Reserve Power Available (kW) No Yes 
Hydraulic Oil Temperature (oC)  No No 
Lube Oil Temperature (oC)  No No 
Running Hours (hrs)  No No 
DIGITAL CONTROL SIGNAL 
Start Yes Yes 
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DESCRIPTION CRITICAL REDUNDANT 
Stop  Yes Yes 
Connect Yes Yes 
Dis-connect Yes Yes 
Increase Load/Speed Yes Yes 
Decrease Load/Speed Yes Yes 
Local/Remote  No No 
Running  No No 
DIGITAL MONITORING SIGNAL 
Local  Yes Yes 
Remote Yes Yes 
Running Yes Yes 
Running Idle  No No 
Run Rated No No 
Shutdown Yes Yes 
Start Inhibit No No 
System Ok No No 
Circuit Breaker (CB) Opened Yes Yes 
CB Closed  Yes Yes 
LO Tank Low  Yes Yes 
Hydraulic Pressure Low  Yes Yes 
Phase Fault Error No No 
Emergency Yes Yes 
VFD Interlock Yes Yes 
Table 4: Power System – Signal Configuration 
DESCRIPTION CRITICAL REDUNDANT 
ENGINE / GENERATOR – 8 unit (1oo2) 
ANALOG CONTROL SIGNAL 
Load Ref (KW)  Yes Yes 
Frequency Ref (Hz)  Yes Yes 
Re-active Load (kVAR)  Yes Yes 
Load Dev (KW) Yes Yes 
Frequency Dev (Hz)  Yes Yes 
Voltage Dev Yes Yes 
Load % Yes Yes 
ANALOG MONITORING SIGNAL 
Load (kW) Yes Yes 
Re-active Load (kVAR) Yes Yes 
Current (A) Yes Yes 
Voltage (V)  Yes Yes 
Power Factor  Yes No 
Frequency (Hz)  Yes No 
Fuel Rack Pos (%)  Yes No 
Field Current (A)  Yes No 
Speed (RPM)  Yes No 
SWBD Load (kW)  Yes No 
Winding Temperature U (oC )  No No 
Winding Temperature V (oC )  No No 
Winding Temperature W (oC )  No No 
Engine Cylinder Temp 1 (oC )  No No 
Engine Cylinder Temp 2 (oC )  No No 
Engine Cylinder Temp 3 (oC )  No No 
Engine Cylinder Temp 4 (oC )  No No 
Engine Cylinder Temp 5 (oC )  No No 
Engine Cylinder Temp 6 (oC )  No No 
Engine Cylinder Temp 7 (oC )  No No 
Engine Cylinder Temp 8 (oC )  No No 
DESCRIPTION CRITICAL REDUNDANT 
Fuel Oil Temp (oC )  No No 
Lube Oil Temp (oC )  No No 
Running Hours (hrs) No No 
DIGITAL CONTROL SIGNAL 
Start Yes Yes 
Stop Yes Yes 
Connect  Yes Yes 
Dis-connect  Yes Yes 
Increase Load/Speed Yes Yes 
Decrease Load/Speed Yes Yes 
Local/Remote  No No 
Running  No No 
AVR Fail  Yes Yes 
DIGITAL MONITORING SIGNAL 
Local  Yes Yes 
Remote  Yes Yes 
Running  Yes Yes 
Running Idle  No No 
Run Rated No No 
Shutdown Yes Yes 
Droop Mode  No No 
Isoch Mode  No No 
AGS Mode  No No 
Start Inhibit No No 
System Ok No No 
CB Opened Yes Yes 
CB Closed  Yes Yes 
Table 5: Electrical System – Signal Configuration 
DESCRIPTION CRITICAL REDUNDANT 
SWITCHBOARD SWBD – 4 UNITS (1oo2) 
ANALOG MONITORING  
SWBD 1 Voltage (kV) Yes Yes 
SWBD 1 Frequency (Hz) Yes Yes 
SWBD 2 Voltage (kV) Yes Yes 
SWBD 2 Frequency (Hz) Yes Yes 
SWBD 3 Voltage (kV) Yes Yes 
SWBD 3 Frequency (Hz) Yes Yes 
SWBD 4 Voltage (kV) Yes Yes 
SWBD 4 Frequency (Hz) Yes Yes 
SWBD 1 Load (Kw) No Yes 
SWBD 1 Spare Load (Kw) No Yes 
SWBD 1 Load Percentage (%) No Yes 
SWBD 2 Load (Kw) No Yes 
SWBD 2 Spare Load (Kw) No Yes 
SWBD 2 Load Percentage (%) No Yes 
SWBD 3 Load (Kw) No Yes 
SWBD 3 Spare Load (Kw) No Yes 
SWBD 3 Load (%) No Yes 
SWBD 4 Load (Kw) No Yes 
SWBD 4 Spare Load (Kw) No Yes 
SWBD 4 Load (%) No Yes 
DIGITAL CONTROL SIGNAL 
SWBD1 Slave CB Connect Yes Yes 
SWBD1 Slave CB Dis-Connect  Yes Yes 
SWBD1 Master CB Connect Yes Yes 
SWBD1 Master CB Dis-Connect  Yes Yes 
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DESCRIPTION CRITICAL REDUNDANT 
SWBD2 Slave CB Connect Yes Yes 
SWBD2 Slave CB Dis-Connect  Yes Yes 
SWBD2 Master CB Connect Yes Yes 
SWBD2 Master CB Dis-Connect  Yes Yes 
SWBD3 Slave CB Connect Yes Yes 
SWBD3 Slave CB Dis-Connect  Yes Yes 
SWBD3 Master CB Connect Yes Yes 
SWBD3 Master CB Dis-Connect  Yes Yes 
SWBD4 Slave CB Connect Yes Yes 
SWBD4 Slave CB Dis-Connect  Yes Yes 
SWBD4 Master CB Connect Yes Yes 
SWBD4 Master CB Dis-Connect  Yes Yes 
DIGITAL MONITORING SIGNAL 
SWBD1 Earth Fault Yes Yes 
SWBD 1 Blackout Yes Yes 
SWBD 1 Dead Bus Yes Yes 
SWBD 1 Slave CB Fault Yes Yes 
SWBD 1 Master CB Fault Yes Yes 
SWBD 2 Earth Fault Yes Yes 
SWBD 2 Blackout Yes Yes 
SWBD 2 Dead Bus Yes Yes 
SWBD 2 Slave CB Fault Yes Yes 
SWBD 2 Master CB Fault Yes Yes 
SWBD 3 Earth Fault Yes Yes 
SWBD 3 Blackout Yes Yes 
SWBD 3 Dead Bus Yes Yes 
SWBD 3 Slave CB Fault Yes Yes 
SWBD 3 Master CB Fault Yes Yes 
SWBD 4 Earth Fault Yes Yes 
SWBD 4 Blackout Yes Yes 
SWBD 4 Dead Bus Yes Yes 
SWBD 4 Slave CB Fault Yes Yes 
SWBD 4 Master CB Fault Yes Yes 
UPS Fault Yes Yes 
Open Bus Fault Yes Yes 
Closed Bus Fault Yes Yes 
Table 6: Environmental System – Signal Configuration 
DESCRIPTION CRITICAL REDUNDANT 
WIND SENSOR – 3 Unit (1oo3) 
Relative Speed (A) m/s Yes Yes 
Relative Direction (A) deg Yes Yes 
Preferred (D) No No 
Enable (D) No No 
Failure / Error (D) No No 
WAVE – 3 Unit (1oo3) 
Wave Drift - Force Yes Yes 
Wave Momentum Yes Yes 
Preferred (D) No No 
Enable (D) No No 
Failure / Error (D) No No 
CURRENT – Model (1oo3) 
Current Speed (A) m/s Yes Yes 
Current Direction (A) deg Yes Yes 
Preferred (D) No No 
Enable (D) No No 
Failure / Error (D) No No 
Table 7: Human / Operator Error System – Signal Configuration 
DESCRIPTION CRITICAL REDUNDANT 
DEXTIRITY (DEX) 
Level 1 Yes Yes 
Level 2 Yes Yes 
Level 3 Yes Yes 
DECISION (DEC) 
Level 1 Yes Yes 
Level 2 Yes Yes 
Level 3 Yes Yes 
DISTRACTION (DIS) 
Level 1 Yes Yes 
Level 2 Yes Yes 
Level 3 Yes Yes 
SITUATION AWARENESS (SA) 
Level 1 Yes Yes 
Level 2 Yes Yes 
Level 3 Yes Yes 
TANGIBLE EXTERNAL 
Weather  No No 
Technical failures No No 
Temperature No No 
Documentation No No 
Design No No 
INTANGIBLE EXTERNAL 
Relationship No No 
Commercial Pressures No No 
Financial No No 
Culture No No 
TANGIBLE INTERNAL 
Illness No No 
Fatigue No No 
Stress No No 
Drugs No No 
INTANGIBLE INTERNAL 
Dis-Orientation No No 
Fixation No No 
Visual Illusions No No 
Denial No No 
Memory No No 
4. Experimental Set-Up
DP system is a composite entity with complex integration
between sub-system comprising equipment, software, facilitates,
materials, procedures and personnel. In this paper we have
considered the analysis for the sub-systems from two different
points of view [16]:
• Structural Focus
• Functional Focus
The reliability block diagrams are built as success oriented 
networks illustrating how the sub-systems operate as functional 
blocks to fulfil the overall DP system functional requirement [6, 
7]. The structure of the RBD is described mathematically by 
structure functions. These structure function will be used to 
calculate the sub-system reliability. 
6
The experimental set-up for the reliability calculation of the sub-
systems was performed with the following parameters defined as 








o Natural Environmental threats
o Infrastructure threats and Social threats
o Threats from other technical system
For this particular experiment, the data from a DP 3 vessel was 
used which was taken from a historical database during the 
annual trial and these samples are stored as time series with 
sample interval of 1 milli-second. The data was extracted for the 
period of the annual trial which was for one week and in addition, 
operation data for a period of two years was extracted.  The sub-
system signals were identified and grouped across different 
categorizations, considering the design phase for evaluation. The 
data was split into train and test for LSTM prediction and data 
was sorted to use for mathematical calculation. In this section the 
reliability of the seven sub-systems is calculated through 
mathematical computation through equation in next section and 
deep learning algorithm LSTM. The research framework of the 
experiment is shown in Figure 2 where the information from the 
sub-system level is carefully selected and diligently used for the 
calculation and prediction. 
4.1 Mathematical Computation of DP Sub-System 
Reliability 
The mathematical computation of reliability of DP sub-systems 
is highly dependent on the structural focus which is expressed 
through the RBDs. The structural physical architecture defines 
the basis system hierarchy of each of the sub-systems and the 
association of lower parts and components with higher level 
assemblies and systems. Once the structural aspects of the 
physical sub-system are defined then the functional focus is 
taken into consideration for the mathematical computation [16, 
18, 8]. As shown in Figure 2, for mathematical computation, 
each sub-system is further divided into groups of equipment. The 
three main activities involved in the calculation of reliability of 
sub-systems are [19]: 
• Reliability Block Diagram based on system
configuration
• System Diagnostic based on voting group
• Pattern recognition for functional fault identification
The reliability of sub-systems can be calculated thought the 
below mathematical equation [20, 12]: 
PFDSUB-SYSTEM = PFDCOMP1 + PFDCOMP2 + …… + PFDCOMPn 
Where 
PFDSUB-SYSTEM  → Average probability of failure on demand for DP sub-system 
PFDCOMP1  → Average probability of failure on demand for components 
n → Number of components in the sub-system 
Figure 2. DP Sub-System Reliability Computation Framework 
Note: The description of abbreviations is in Table 1 to 7 
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The arrangement and voting of components can in one of the 
following architectures, as shown in Figure 3,4 5, 6 & 7.  
1oo1: 
𝑃𝐹𝐷𝐴𝑉𝐺 = (𝜆𝐷𝑈 + 𝜆𝐷𝐷)𝑡𝐶𝐸
1oo2: 







𝑃𝐹𝐷𝐴𝑉𝐺 = 6((1 − 𝛽𝐷)𝜆𝐷𝐷 + (1 − 𝛽)𝜆𝐷𝑈)
3𝑡𝐶𝐸𝑡𝐺𝐸𝑡𝐺2𝐸













𝜆𝐷𝑈→ Dangerous Undetected failure rate of a channel in a Subsystem
𝜆𝐷𝐷→ Detected dangerous failure rate of a channel in a subsystem
𝑡𝐶𝐸 → Calculate the channel equivalent mean down time
𝑡𝐺𝐸 → System equivalent down time 
𝛽 → The fraction of undetected failures that have a  common cause 
𝛽𝐷 → the fraction that have a common cause of those failures that are detected 
by the diagnostic tests 
𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅 → Mean time to restoration 
𝑀𝑅𝑇 →  Mean repair time 
𝑇1 → Proof test interval
𝑇2 → Interval between demands 
The system architecture / voting are used to calculate sub-system 
Reliability from Probability of failure on demand (PFD) [18, 12]: 
Reference System (A1): 
PFDA1 = PFDGYRO + PFDMRU + PFDGPS + PFDDGPS 
𝑃𝐹𝐷𝐴1 = {6((1 − 𝛽𝐷)𝜆𝐷𝐷 + (1 − 𝛽)𝜆𝐷𝑈)
3
𝑡𝐶𝐸𝑡𝐺𝐸𝑡𝐺2𝐸 +
𝛽𝐷𝜆𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅 + 𝛽𝜆𝐷𝑈 (
𝑇1
2
+ 𝑀𝑅𝑇)} + {2𝜆𝐷𝑡𝐶𝐸} + {6((1 − 𝛽𝐷)𝜆𝐷𝐷 +
(1 − 𝛽)𝜆𝐷𝑈)
3




{2((1 − 𝛽𝐷)𝜆𝐷𝐷 + (1 − 𝛽)𝜆𝐷𝑈)





DP control System  (A2): 
PFDA2 = PFDOS + PFDNDU + PFDFS + PFDRCU 
𝑃𝐹𝐷𝐴2 = {2((1 − 𝛽𝐷)𝜆𝐷𝐷 + (1 − 𝛽)𝜆𝐷𝑈)









+ 𝑀𝑅𝑇)} + {2((1 − 𝛽𝐷)𝜆𝐷𝐷 + (1 −
𝛽)𝜆𝐷𝑈)
2𝑡𝐶𝐸𝑡𝐺𝐸 + 𝛽𝐷𝜆𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅 + 𝛽𝜆𝐷𝑈(
𝑇1
2
+ 𝑀𝑅𝑇)} + {6((1 −
𝛽𝐷)𝜆𝐷𝐷 + (1 − 𝛽)𝜆𝐷𝑈)





Thruster / Propulsion System (A3): 
PFDA3 = PFDT1 + PFDT2 + PFDT3 + PFDT4 + PFDT5 + PFDT6 + 
PFDT7 + PFDT8 
𝑃𝐹𝐷𝐴3 = {2((1 − 𝛽𝐷)𝜆𝐷𝐷 + (1 − 𝛽)𝜆𝐷𝑈)









+ 𝑀𝑅𝑇)} + {2((1 − 𝛽𝐷)𝜆𝐷𝐷 + (1 −
𝛽)𝜆𝐷𝑈)
2𝑡𝐶𝐸𝑡𝐺𝐸 + 𝛽𝐷𝜆𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅 + 𝛽𝜆𝐷𝑈(
𝑇1
2
+ 𝑀𝑅𝑇)} + {2((1 −
𝛽𝐷)𝜆𝐷𝐷 + (1 − 𝛽)𝜆𝐷𝑈)




Power System (A4): 
PFDA4 = (PFDDG1 + PFDDG2)+ (PFDDG3 + PFDDG4)+ (PFDDG5 + 
PFDDG6)+  (PFDDG7 + PFDDG8) 
𝑃𝐹𝐷𝐴4 = {2((1 − 𝛽𝐷)𝜆𝐷𝐷 + (1 − 𝛽)𝜆𝐷𝑈)









+ 𝑀𝑅𝑇)} + {2((1 − 𝛽𝐷)𝜆𝐷𝐷 + (1 −
𝛽)𝜆𝐷𝑈)
2𝑡𝐶𝐸𝑡𝐺𝐸 + 𝛽𝐷𝜆𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅 + 𝛽𝜆𝐷𝑈(
𝑇1
2
+ 𝑀𝑅𝑇)} + {2((1 −
𝛽𝐷)𝜆𝐷𝐷 + (1 − 𝛽)𝜆𝐷𝑈)




Figure 4 1oo2 architecture 
Figure 3 1oo1 architecture 
Figure 5 1oo3 architecture 
Figure 7 2oo3 architecture 
Figure 6 2oo2 architecture 
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Electrical System (A5): 
PFDA5 = PFDSWBD1 + PFDSWBD2 + PFDSWBD3 + PFDSWBD4 + PFDCB1 
+ PFDCB2 +  PFDCB3 + PFDCB4 
𝑃𝐹𝐷𝐴5 = {(𝜆𝐷𝑈 + 𝜆𝐷𝐷)𝑡𝐶𝐸} + {(𝜆𝐷𝑈 + 𝜆𝐷𝐷)𝑡𝐶𝐸} + {(𝜆𝐷𝑈 +
𝜆𝐷𝐷)𝑡𝐶𝐸)} + {(𝜆𝐷𝑈 + 𝜆𝐷𝐷)𝑡𝐶𝐸} +  {(𝜆𝐷𝑈 + 𝜆𝐷𝐷)𝑡𝐶𝐸} + {(𝜆𝐷𝑈 +
𝜆𝐷𝐷)𝑡𝐶𝐸} + {(𝜆𝐷𝑈 + 𝜆𝐷𝐷)𝑡𝐶𝐸)} + {(𝜆𝐷𝑈 + 𝜆𝐷𝐷)𝑡𝐶𝐸}
Environmental System (A6): 
PFDA6 = PFDWIND + PFDWAVE + PFDCURRENT 
𝑃𝐹𝐷𝐴6 = {6((1 − 𝛽𝐷)𝜆𝐷𝐷 + (1 − 𝛽)𝜆𝐷𝑈)
3
𝑡𝐶𝐸𝑡𝐺𝐸𝑡𝐺2𝐸 +
𝛽𝐷𝜆𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅 + 𝛽𝜆𝐷𝑈 (
𝑇1
2
+ 𝑀𝑅𝑇)} + {6((1 − 𝛽𝐷)𝜆𝐷𝐷 + (1 −
𝛽)𝜆𝐷𝑈)
3
𝑡𝐶𝐸𝑡𝐺𝐸𝑡𝐺2𝐸 + 𝛽𝐷𝜆𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅 + 𝛽𝜆𝐷𝑈 (
𝑇1
2
+ 𝑀𝑅𝑇)} + {6((1 −
𝛽𝐷)𝜆𝐷𝐷 + (1 − 𝛽)𝜆𝐷𝑈)
3




𝑀𝑅𝑇)} + {6((1 − 𝛽𝐷)𝜆𝐷𝐷 + (1 − 𝛽)𝜆𝐷𝑈)
3
𝑡𝐶𝐸𝑡𝐺𝐸𝑡𝐺2𝐸 +




Human / Operator Error (A7): 
PFDA7 = PFDDEX + PFDDEC + PFDS + PFDDGPS 
𝑃𝐹𝐷𝐴7 = {6((1 − 𝛽𝐷)𝜆𝐷𝐷 + (1 − 𝛽)𝜆𝐷𝑈)
3
𝑡𝐶𝐸𝑡𝐺𝐸𝑡𝐺2𝐸 +
𝛽𝐷𝜆𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅 + 𝛽𝜆𝐷𝑈 (
𝑇1
2
+ 𝑀𝑅𝑇)} + {6((1 − 𝛽𝐷)𝜆𝐷𝐷 + (1 −
𝛽)𝜆𝐷𝑈)
3
𝑡𝐶𝐸𝑡𝐺𝐸𝑡𝐺2𝐸 + 𝛽𝐷𝜆𝐷𝐷𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑅 + 𝛽𝜆𝐷𝑈 (
𝑇1
2
+ 𝑀𝑅𝑇)} + {6((1 −
𝛽𝐷)𝜆𝐷𝐷 + (1 − 𝛽)𝜆𝐷𝑈)
3




𝑀𝑅𝑇)} + {6((1 − 𝛽𝐷)𝜆𝐷𝐷 + (1 − 𝛽)𝜆𝐷𝑈)
3
𝑡𝐶𝐸𝑡𝐺𝐸𝑡𝐺2𝐸 +




Therefore, the overall reliability of DP system (DP-RI) is 
calculated as per equation (1): 
PFDDP = PFDA1 + PFDA2 + PFDA3 + PFDA4 + PFDA5 + PFDA6
+ PFDA7                                                                     (1) 
4.2 LSTM prediction of DP Sub-System Reliability 
Reliability prediction is becoming the most commonly used 
method in the oil and gas industry for predicting the reliability of 
complex systems [17, 21, 8]. For this specific application the 
research framework is defined in Figure 2. The DP sub-system 
data from the field and test simulations are used for training the 
deep learning algorithm LSTM for predicting the near future 
values.  
The experimental set-up for the reliability prediction was based 
on the following parameters and boundaries, defined upfront to 
address the uncertainties through the key parameters [18]: 
• Reliability Prediction uses (Why)
o Reliability goal assessment
o Mission Reliability Estimation
o Prediction of Reliability performance
• Reliability Prediction in the system life cycle (When)
o Operational Phase
• Factors to select Reliability Prediction method (What)
o Product Technology
o Consequence of failure
o Failure criticality
The field data are directly extracted from the DP3 vessel for 
which the mathematical computation was performed using the 
RBD model. The LSTM model was developed for the reliability 
prediction and the field data of DP 3 vessel was used which was 
taken from a historical database during the annual trial was used 
to train the model. The test data was simulated to address bias 
for the missing system configuration. The reliability prediction 
through LSTM was performed with the information such as 
Reliability requirements, System Architecture, Operating 
environment, operating profile and failures, mechanism and 
causes were fed into the model to ensure that there will be the 
desired degree of precision in the prediction as per IEEE 1413 
standard [18]. This is real-time prediction which involves the 
prediction of future system reliability based on the information 
of the current and past status of the sub-systems. 
The LSTM model is a variant of Recurrent Neural Networks 
(RNN) which are application specific and use purpose-built 
memory cells to address time series prediction for sequential data 
[22, 23]. This unique attribute of LSTM supports the model to 
hold only relevant data and at the same time ‘removing’ or 
‘forgetting’ in the memory cells which are regulated by structures 
called gates. Each of the memory cells have three gates 
maintaining and adjusting its cell state   𝑠(𝑡): 
• Forget gate:  𝑓(𝑡) which defines what information is
removed from the cell state
• Input gate:   𝑖(𝑡) which specifies what information is added
to the cell state
• Output gate:  𝑜(𝑡) which specifies what information in the
cell state is used.
The real-time sequential update formula is represented by 
𝑔(𝑡) =  𝑡𝑎𝑛ℎ(𝑊𝑔𝑥𝑥
(𝑡) + 𝑊𝑔ℎℎ
(𝑡−1) + 𝑏𝑔)
𝑰𝒏𝒑𝒖𝒕 𝑮𝒂𝒕𝒆:    𝑖(𝑡) =  𝜎(𝑊𝑖𝑥𝑥
(𝑡) + 𝑊𝑖ℎℎ
(𝑡−1) +  𝑏𝑖)
𝑭𝒐𝒓𝒈𝒆𝒕 𝑮𝒂𝒕𝒆:  𝑓(𝑡) =  𝜎(𝑊𝑓𝑥𝑥
(𝑡) +  𝑊𝑓ℎℎ
(𝑡−1) + 𝑏𝑓)
𝑶𝒖𝒕𝒑𝒖𝒕 𝑮𝒂𝒕𝒆:  𝑜(𝑡) =  𝜎(𝑊𝑜𝑥𝑥
(𝑡) + 𝑊𝑜ℎℎ
(𝑡−1) +  𝑏𝑜)
𝑪𝒆𝒍𝒍 𝑺𝒕𝒂𝒕𝒆:        𝑠(𝑡) =   𝑔(𝑡) ⊚ 𝑖(𝑡) + 𝑠(𝑡−1) ⊚ 𝑜(𝑡)       
𝑯𝒊𝒅𝒅𝒆𝒏 𝑮𝒂𝒕𝒆:  ℎ(𝑡) = tanh( 𝑠(𝑡)) ⊚ 𝑜(𝑡)       
𝑶𝒖𝒕𝒑𝒖𝒕 𝑳𝒂𝒚𝒆𝒓: 𝑦(𝑡) =  (𝑊ℎ𝑦ℎ
(𝑡) + 𝑏𝑦)
Where  x^((t)) is the input vector for the time step t, W are the 
network weights, b are bias parameters, y is the output to be 
compared to observations, h is the hidden state, σ is the 
sigmoidal function, ⊚ is element wise multiplication and s is 
called the cell state of memory cells, which is unique to LSTM. 
The Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) represents the prediction 
accuracy and it is defined by [1]: 
𝑹𝑺𝑴𝑬 =  √
𝟏
𝑳
∑ (𝑽𝒋 − ?̂?𝒋)
𝟐𝑳
𝒋=𝟏
Where ∑ is summation, 𝑳  is sample size,   𝑽𝒋 is predicted values
and ?̂?𝒋  is calculated or actual values. 
9
The Correlation Coefficient (CC) represents the linear 
dependency of two random variables. The linear dependency is 
strong if CC is greater than 0.8 and weak if CC is less than 0.5. 
𝑪𝑪 =  
𝑪𝒐𝒗 (𝑽,?̂?)
√𝑽𝒂𝒓 (𝑽)𝑽𝒂𝒓(?̂?)
Where 𝑽 is predicted values, ?̂?  is calculated or actual values, 
Cov () is covariance  and Var () refer to the variance operator. 
The Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU) is a simpler version of LSTM 
where the cellular state and the hidden state are combined which 
reduces the number of variables [24]. ELM provides a unified 
solution for a generalized feedforward network. In ELM, the 
input parameters, hidden node parameters are randomly 
generated, and output weights are computed analytically. The 
unique feature of ELM is high accuracy, minimal user 
intervention and real-time learning [24]. From Table 8 it is 
clearly evident that the performance indices of the LSTM model 
outperform the other deep learning algorithms that were tested. 
Therefore, LSTM was chosen for further research by optimizing 
for the activation function (ReLU) and hyperparameters (number 
of neurons = 400 , hidden layers = 6 and Learning rate = 0.3). 
Table 8. Performance Analysis Results 
SNo MACHINE LEARNING RSME CC 
1 LSTM 0.000713 0.9518 
2 GRU 0.3078 0.8895 
3 ELM 0.2578 0.8789 
5. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
In this section, we present the results of the reliability of DP sub-
systems derived from two different methods: one through
mathematical computation and another through the deep learning
algorithm model. The Root Mean Square Error (RMSE) is used
as the performance measure to compare the performance of
prediction against mathematical calculation [1].
Figure 8  RMSE curve of LSTM with optimized hyperparameters 
First, we present results of the reliability at sub-system level 
using the data collected from the same sources (vessel, 
configuration, period and mode of operation). A total of 4500 
samples for each sub-system were collected and 3000 samples 
used in the training which was collected from the vessel during 
operational phase. The remaining data of 1500 samples were 
used for testing for each sub-system. In this experiment the 
comparison was performed in offline mode as online sequential 
operation was not possible to due to a confidentiality agreement 
and cybersecurity risks when interfacing the research laptop to 
the actual operational technology loop in the vessel. 
The framework was developed for a DP 3 vessel where all the 
possible configurations, operation modes, voting logics and 
system architectures can be tested to evaluate the suitability for 
DP2 and DP1 vessels. As shown in the Table 9 and Figure 8, 
LSTM can predict the reliability of the DP-sub-system 
accurately under various conditions.  
Table 9 DP sub-system reliability RSME 
SNo Number of Samples RSME 
1 1500 0.005102 
2 2000 0.003428 
3 2500 0.001895 
4 3000 0.001289 
5 3500 0.001099 
6 4000 0.000919 
7 4500 0.000713 
In general, mathematical calculation involves huge 
computational effort and requires significant processing time, 
which limits its applicability for complex marine operations 
where the time for action is very limited. The deep learning 
algorithm LSTM provides a method for faster prediction of 
reliability of sub-systems and provides information directly 
during critical operations. Based on the type of Graphical 
Processing Unit (GPU) used in the Google Cloud Engine, the 
computation time will range from 30 minutes (8 GPUs, 96 GB 
GDDR5, 1 - 64 vCPUs,1-416 GB) to 8 hours (2 GPUs,16 GB 
GDDR5. 1 - 48 vCPUs, 1 - 312 GB). This supports the operator 
to make decisions at the right time more effectively. 
Table 10 DP-RI calculation and prediction comparison 
CASE CASE ID IN IMCA DATABSAE CAL VAL LSTM 
1 Year 2005  →  0501 70.1 70.3 
2 Year 2006  → 0614 82.6 81.9 
3 Year 2008  → 0892 60.4 60.9 
4 Year 2009  → 0908 50.7 50.6 
5 Year 2010  → 1047 34.5 33.9 
6 Year 2011  → 1105 76.9 76.6 
7 Year 2014  → 1431 56.1 55.9 
8 Year 2015  → 1517 65.9 65.8 
9 Year 2017  → 1787 48.4 48.6 
10 Year 2018  → 18123 58.9 58.8 
Secondly, in the research we present the results based on a 
cascaded bottom-up approach to evaluate the prediction at 
system level for DP-RI values. The results of the LSTM 
prediction for the DP-RI matched with the mathematical 
calculation as shown in Table 10 when the validation was 
performed for the 10 different case studies obtained from IMCA 
accident database [25]. In addition, LSTM showed improved 
results for the DP-RI when compared with its prediction at sub-
10
system level. This is due to the fact that the model was able to 
train itself with the different data during the testing period for the 
unknown values and correct it with the approximations. 
Therefore, LSTM can be applied at system level for DP-RI 
prediction. 
6. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have investigated the performance of LSTM to
predict the reliability for sub-systems of Dynamic Positioning.
The proposed framework was effective as it included both a
mathematical computation approach to compute reliability of DP
sub-systems and a data driven approach to predict the reliability
at a sub-system level. This provided a way to evaluate
performance and accuracy of the model prediction against the
mathematical computation.  The data was collected from the
vessel during annual trial phase for a period of one week and the
previous two years operational data were taken from an event
logger / historical station. The data from the first year of
operation was used for training and the data from the second year
was used for testing. The data is chosen such that the study
covers all the different possible scenarios of operations. The
framework can be used on any operational vessel to predict the
reliability of sub-systems at any point in time during complex
marine operations.
It must be noted that the work on prediction of reliability for sub-
systems of DP using LSTM can be easily extended to the overall 
DP system for prediction for DP-RI. This will support in vessel 
performance analysis, operation planning and prescriptive 
solutions in the case of any failures in components during 
complex operations. Moreover, the features that are critical for 
each sub-system are selected based on the guidelines provided 
by IMCA, Classification societies such as DNV GL, ABS, LR 
etc. and DP system vendors. However, there is a need for a 
detailed study on the effects of individual sub-systems on overall 
performance during different configuration / operation modes/ 
voting logic throughout the life cycle of the DP system. 
Therefore, the ideal choice of critical signals and optimized deep 
learning algorithm for DP-RI prediction with prescriptive 
analytics will be a separate study topic for future work. 
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